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Note
Second Class Speech: The Court's
Refinement of Content Regulation
Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61
(1981).
To permit the continued building of our politics and culture, and to assure
self-fulfillment for each individual, our people are guaranteed the right to
express any thought free from government censorship. The essence of
this forbidden censorship is content control.1
L INTRODUCTION
There are two fundamental principles of the first amendment of
the United States Constitution.2 First, government cannot regu-
late protected speech on the basis of content;3 second, nonobscene
expression is protected.4 Both of these principles were disre-
garded by the United States Supreme Court in 1976 when it
decided Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc.,5 and upheld a zon-
ing ordinance which made concentrations of adult theaters unlaw-
ful. Young thus became the first Supreme Court decision to
squarely sanction regulation of protected speech on the basis of
content.6 Until Young, the Court had consistently refused to allow
1. Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95-96 (1972).
2. U.S. CONST. amend L The first amendment provides in pertinent part: "Con-
gress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech...." Id.
3. Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972).
4. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 19-20 (1971).
5. 427 U.S. 50 (1976). For a discussion of the Young decision, see notes 33-39 &
accompanying text infra.
6. Perhaps United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), in which the Court up-
held O'Brien's conviction for burning a draft card in public, can be viewed as
Court-sanctioned regulation of speech based on content. See note 121 infra.
This Warren Court decision has since been interpreted as involving a regula-
tion which only incidentally infringed on speech. See Young v. American
Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 79 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring); cf. I TamE,
AMEmICAN CoNsTrT oNAL LAw § 12-6, at 594-98 (1978) (OB-ien was wrongly
decided because the Court refused to look at Congressional motive).
Much of the O'Brien rationale was undermined in Spence v. Washington,
418 U.S. 405 (1974), where the Court upheld a defendant's right to display the
American flag upside down with a peace symbol on it. In Spence the Court
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regulation of protected speech based on content.7 Since Young,
the Court has become increasingly tolerant of content-based regu-
lations; however, it has never formulated an adequate model with
which to apply its content-based doctrine.
Recently, the Supreme Court limited the extent to which states
may regulate speech on the basis of content in Schad v. Borough of
Mount Ephraim,s a case which is factually quite similar to Young
but reaches a contrary result.9 In Schad, the Court attempted to
harmonize its new content-based doctrine with traditional first
amendment analysis and thereby develop a workable model. How-
ever, the model set forth in Schad is difficult to apply in view of
prior Supreme Court decisions, and an examination of those deci-
sions is necessary to provide a perspective from which to view
Schad and posit its impact on first amendment adjudication.
This Note will examine the Court's prior decisions regarding
the doctrine of content regulation and the insights into that doc-
trine provided by Schad. This analysis will reveal the difficulty in
developing a workable first amendment model for permissible con-
tent regulation. While the relationship of first amendment rights
recognized the communicative nature of the defendant's conduct, something
it refused to do in O'Brien.
7. Speech classified as "unprotected" may be regulated. Such speech includes:
"obscenity," Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), and "fighting words,"
Chaplinksy v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942). See Comment, Fighting
Words Doctrine-Is There a Clear and Present Danger to the Standard?, 84
DIcK. L. REV. 75 (1979) (questions whether 'fighting words" remains a viable
doctrine). While commercial speech is protected, Virginia State Bd. of Phar-
macy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976), the
Court has indicated that commercial speech has a subordinate position under
the first amendment guarantees. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447
(1978). See Roberts, Toward a General Theory of Commercial Speech and the
First Amendment, 40 Omo STATE L.J. 115 (1979) (commercial speech is pro-
tected in a modified Court doctrine that gives it less protection than noncom-
mercial speech). Commercial speech may be regulated on the basis of
content. In Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 101 S. Ct. 2882 (1981), the
Court set forth a four-part test to determine the validity of a restriction on
commercial speech. It stated:
(1) The First Amendment protects commercial speech only if that
speech concerns lawful activity and is not misleading. A restriction
on otherwise protected commercial speech is valid only if it (2) seeks
to implement a substantial government interest, (3) directly ad-
vances that interest, and (4) reaches no further than necessary to
accomplish the given objective.
Id. at 2892.
8. 452 U.S. 61 (1981).
9. Both cases involved zoning ordinances which restricted some types of
speech. In Schad the zoning ordinance prohibited live entertainment while
in Young the zoning ordinance required a dispersal of adult theaters. For a
discussion of the distinctions made by the Schad Court between the case
before it and Young, see notes 105-17 & accompanying text infra.
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to local zoning power is beyond the scope of this Note,' 0 an under-
standing of the Court's theoretical first amendment framework can
be particularly relevant to zoning in view of the posture of the
Schad and Young cases, which both involved constitutional at-
tacks on city zoning ordinances.
I. CONTENT REGULATION IN PERSPECTIVE
The Supreme Court's development of a doctrine regarding the
extent to which states may regulate speech on the basis of content
pervaded the 1970s.11 However, the roots of permissible content
regulation can be traced to the 1942 case of Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire'2 in which the Court upheld Chaplinsky's conviction
under a statute which prohibited addressing "any offensive, deri-
sive or annoying word" to persons in any street or other public
place.13 The Court found that Chaplinsky's statements to a city
marshall' 4 were "fighting words,"' 5 unprotected by the first
amendment, and in now famous dictum,16 stated: "There are cer-
tain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the pre-
vention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise
any constitutional problem."' 7 The Chaplinsky dictum led to a cat-
egorization test, under which speech is classified as protected or
unprotected based on its content.' 8 Under this test, if the content
of the speech is protected, the state can only impose reasonable
restrictions on the time, place, and manner of speech.' 9
10. The constitutional issues of local zoning power and the first amendment doc-
trines of overbreadth and time, place, and manner restrictions will not be ad-
dressed in this Note. For a good discussion of the overbreadth doctrine, see
Note, First Amendment Vagueness and Overbreadth. Theoretical Revision by
the Burger Court, 31 VAmD. L. REV. 609 (1978). For a discussion of zoning and
association rights, see L. TRmE, supra note 6, § 15-18, at 974-80.
11. L. TRIBE, supra note 6, § 12-18, at 672-74.
12. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
13. Id. at 569.
14. On a city street Chaplinsky had called a city marshall a "God damned racket-
eer and a damned fascist." Id.
15. Id. at 573. See Gard, Fighting Words as Free Speech, 58 WASH. U. L.Q. 531, 577
(1980).
16. Cases in which the dictum was cited include: Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15,
20 (1973); Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 461 (1966) (White, J., dis-
senting); Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 298 (1951) (Jackson, J., dissenting);
Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 26 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
17. 315 U.S. at 571-72.
18. See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337
U.S. 1 (1949). See also Goldman, A Doctrine of Worthier Speeck Young v.
American Mini Theatres, Inc., 21 ST. Louis U. L.J. 281, 282 (1977) (Goldman
found the categories of unprotected speech to be "narrowly limited" but not
"well defined").
19. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336
1982]
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While the categorization test was frequently replaced in the
1970s with an equal protection analysis, 20 it was recently used in
the symbolic speech case of Cohen v. California.21 In Cohen, the
Court found that a profane slogan on a jacket worn by Cohen in a
courtroom was a protected form of communication for content reg-
ulation purposes.22 The Court, therefore, overturned Cohen's con-
viction under a breach of the peace statute, 23 finding that the
statute violated his first amendment free speech rights.24
However, the Court ignored the categorization test one year
later in the content regulation case of Police Department v. Mos-
ley 25 where the Court struck down an ordinance which prohibited
all nonlabor picketing within 150 feet of a school. Mosley, a nonla-
bor picketer who was protesting a school's racial policies, was ar-
rested for violating the ordinance.26 The Court used an equal
protection test 27 to resolve the first amendment issue, concluding
that the regulation was not "tailored to a substantial government
interest" and "[t]herefore, under the Equal Protection Clause,
U.S. 77 (1949); Note, Constitutional Law-First Amendment--Content Neu-
trality, 28 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 456 (1978).
20. See notes 25-43 & accompanying text infra.
21. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
22. Id. at 19. The Cohen decision is also important in its recognition of symbolic
speech as protected speech. See Note, Cohen v. California: A New Approach
to an Old Problem?, 9 CAL. W.L. REv. 171 (1972). Additionally, it set a prece-
dent for one's right of privacy while in public. See Haiman, Speech v. Privacy:
Is There a Right Not to be Spoken to?, 67 Nw. U. L. REv. 153 (1972). Cohen has
been interpreted as overturning the Chaplinsky sensibilities test which pro-
tected a person's sensibilities while in public. See Goldman, supra note 18, at
283-84. But see Farber, Civilizing Public Discourse: An Essay on Professor
Bicke Justice Harlan, and the Enduring Significance of Cohen v. California,
1980 DuKE iL. REv. 283 (Cohen v. California shows government cannot be the
moral director of public discourse but it does little else).
23. CAL PENAL CODE § 415 (West 1970) prohibited "maliciously and willfully dis-
turb[ing] the peace or quiet of any neighborhood or person ... by... offen-
sive conduct."
24. 403 U.S. at 16. The Court set forth the first amendment test, stating "[I]n our
judgment, most situations where the State has a justifiable interest in regu-
lating speech will fall within one of the various well established exceptions
... to the usual rule that governmental bodies may not prescribe the form or
content of individual expression." Id. at 24. Since Cohen's speech was pro-
tected, the Court used strict scrutiny to conclude that "absent a more particu-
larized and compelling reason" the state could not make the speech a
criminal offense. Id. at 26.
25. 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
26. Id. at 92-93. For a recent application of Mosley, see Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S.
455 (1980) (Court found that a statute which prohibited only nonlabor picket-
ing violated 1st and 14th amendments).
27. 408 U.S. at 95. The Court stated that the "crucial question is whether there is
an appropriate governmental interest suitably furthered by the differential




An equal protection analysis was again used a few years later in
Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville.29 Citing to Mosley as the proper
precedent,30 the Erznoznik Court invalidated a city ordinance
which prohibited outdoor movies involving nudity.31 However, the
Court's use of equal protection analysis suggested that the ordi-
nance would have been upheld had the city more narrowly tailored
its statute and presented some rationale for distinguishing movies
containing nudity from those without nudity.32 This opened a door
to allowing content regulation under a narrowly drawn statute if
supported by sufficient justification.
After Erznoznik the Court soon found such a regulation in
Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc. ,33 where a Detroit zoning
ordinance which prohibited concentrations of adult theatres was
attacked. In Young, a plurality of the Court explicitly rejected the
proposition that some protected speech could not be singled out
and regulated on the basis of its content.34 Justice Stevens, writing
for the plurality, stated: "[A] line may be drawn on the basis of
content without violating the government's paramount obligation
of neutrality in its regulation of protected communication."3 5 Jus-
tice Stevens, departing from prior cases, 36 rationalized such line-
drawing by focusing on the social value of the speech, stating:
[W]hether political oratory or philosophical discussion moves us to ap-
plaud or to despise what is said, every schoolchild can understand why
our duty to defend the right to speak remains the same. But few of us
would march our sons and daughters off to war to preserve a citizen's right
to see "Specified Sexual Activities" exhibited in theatres of our choice.3 7
28. Id. at 102.
29. 422 U.S. 205 (1975). The Erznoznik Court did not mention the use of a catego-
rization test but simply stated: "[E]ven a traffic regulation cannot discrimi-
nate on the basis of content unless there are clear reasons for the
distinction." Id. at 215.
30. Id.
31. The Jacksonville ordinance prohibited the showing of films containing nudity
in a drive-in theater only when the screen was visible from a public street or
place. Id. at 206-07. Jacksonville contended that the ordinance was designed
to protect captive audiences, to protect youths, and for traffic safety. The
Court questioned the city's justification for "distinguishing movies containing
nudity from all other movies in a regulation designed to protect traffic," id. at
215, and found the statute to be overbroad in meeting the city's interests. Id.
at 208-15.
32. Id. at 215 n.13.
33. 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
34. Id. at 70.
35. Id.
36. The prior cases included: Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976); Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92
(1972); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
37. 427 U.S. at 70. For criticisms of this rationale, see Goldman, supra note 18, at
1982]
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Such a formulation placed the speech in Young at a lower level
than political or philosophical discussion. Justice Stevens also
found that the burden on the "second class" speech was minimal
by using an alternative means analysis and reasoning that there
were alternative theatre sites available.3 8 He then upheld the zon-
ing ordinance using equal protection analysis.39
Armed with the Young opinion, the Supreme Court in FCC v.
Pacifica Foundation4o found that the FCC could validly prohibit
"indecent" language. 4 ' A plurality of the Court in Pacifica af-
firmed the Young proposition that speech could be regulated
based upon its content. It again employed an alternative means
test42 to show the incidental effect on first amendment rights. 43
Together Pacifica and Young established the Court's recognition
of levels of protected speech and the propriety of using an alterna-
tive means test to determine the burden on protected speech.
Thus, under these cases, if there are alternative means available
by which to exercise first amendment rights, the burden on the
"second-class" speech is minimal, and it may be subjected to con-
tent-based regulation. However, because this view was explicitly
embraced by only a plurality of the Court in both decisions, the
decisions were of uncertain precedential value.
300-01; Note, Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc.: Creating Levels of Pro-
tected Speech, 4 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 321, 358-59 (1977).
38. 427 U.S. at 71-72 n.35. Justice Stevens referred to the district court finding
that" '[t] here are myriad locations in the City of Detroit which must be over
1,000 feet from existing regulated establishments. This burden on First
Amendment rights is slight."' Id. (quoting Nortown Theatres, Inc. v. Gribbs,
373 F. Supp. 363, 370 (E.D. Mich. 1974)). Cf. Note, Zoning Content Classifica-
tions for Adult Movie Theatres, 22 Loy. L. REV. 1079 (1976) (questioning
whether the Court will adopt an alternative means test as to time and
manner).
39. Justice Stevens found that the distinction the ordinance made between adult
theaters and other theaters was "justified by the city's interest in preserving
the character of its neighborhoods." 427 U.S. at 71.
40. 438 U.S. 726 (1978). In Pacifica, a George Carlin monologue tape entitled
"Filthy Words" was played on a radio station during an afternoon broadcast.
41. 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1976) forbids the use of "any obscene, indecent, or profane
language by means of radio communications." This statute is part of a fed-
eral criminal code covering obscenity.
42. The Court stated: "Adults who feel the need may purchase tapes and records
or go to theaters and nightclubs to hear these words." 438 U.S. at 750 n.28.
The portion of the opinion relating to the alternative means test was joined
by a majority of the Court.
43. Id. A case decided after Young, Linmark Assocs. v. Willingsboro, 431 U.S. 85
(1977), involved a challenge to an ordinance which prohibited the use of "For
Sale" signs in order to prevent white flight. The Court struck down the ordi-
nance, distinguishing Young as involving a detrimental "secondary effect" on
speech while in the case before it the effect was "primary." Id. at 94. This
distinction was not used in Pacifica.
[Vol. 61:361
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While these cases do not present an analytically clear model,
there are at least four principles relevant to content regulation
which can be extracted from the Court's opinions: (1) different
classes of speech can be regulated based on content,44 (2) the con-
tent regulation issue may be analyzed in terms of the differential
treatment between classes of speech45 using an equal protection
analysis which focuses on the relationship of the regulation to the
state's legislative goal,46 (3) an alternative means test may be used
to examine the extent of the burden on first amendment rights im-
posed by the regulation,47 and (4) the level of judicial scrutiny of
the state's justification4 8 for the regulation depends on the social
value of the speech49 and the importance of the state's interests.5 0
44. See FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 745 (1978); Young v. American
Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 70 (1976).
45. See Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (adult movies
with specified sexual acts versus movies without specified sexual acts);
Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975) (outdoor movies contain-
ing nudity versus movies without nudity); Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92
(1972) (labor versus nonlabor picketing). See notes 25-43 & accompanying
text supra.
46. See Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 71 (1976) ('The re-
maining question is whether a line drawn by these ordinances is justified by
the city's interest in preserving the character of its neighborhoods."). See
also notes 27, 32 & accompanying text supra.
47. See FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 750 n.28 (1978); Young v. Ameri-
can Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 71-72 n.35 (1976).
48. The level of scrutiny is unsettled. While in Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville
the Court scrutinized each justification forwarded by the City of Jacksonville
for its ordinance, 422 U.S. 205, 208-17 (1975), in Young v. American Mini Thea-
tres, Inc., the Court stated: "It is not our function to appraise the wisdom of
[the city's] decision to require adult theatres to be separated rather than con-
centrated in some areas." 427 U.S. 50, 71 (1976).
49. The social value of speech was examined in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation
where the Court stated.
These words offend for the same reasons that obscenity offends.
Their place in the hierarchy of First Amendment values was aptly
sketched by Mr. Justice Murphy when he said. "[Sluch utterances
are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight
social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived
from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and
morality."
438 U.S. 726, 746 (1978) (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568,
572 (1942)) (footnotes omitted). See also note 37 & accompanying text supra.
50. In Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., the Court stated: "[T]he city's in-
terest in attempting to preserve the quality of urban life is one that must be
accorded high respect. Moreover, the city must be allowed a reasonable op-
portunity to experiment with solutions to admittedly serious problems." 427
U.S. 50, 71 (1976). The Young Court also made a distinction between view-
point and subject-based regulations. The Court stated:
[TIhe regulation of the places where sexually explicit films may be
exhibited is unaffected by whatever social, political, or philosophical
message a film may be intended to communicate; whether a motion
19821
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Although these principles were affirmed in Schad, the Court
changed the focus from the social value of the speech to the draft-
ing of acceptable statutes.
II. ANALYSIS
A. The Schad Decision
In Schad, the defendants operated an adult bookstore in Mount
Ephraim, New Jersey, where they installed coin operated mecha-
nisms through which a customer could view a live nude dancer be-
hind a glass panel. The defendants were convicted and fined for
violating a city zoning ordinance which did not list their activity as
a permitted use.51 The New Jersey Superior Court affirmed and
the New Jersey Supreme Court denied review.5 2 The United
States Supreme Court overturned their convictions, finding the or-
dinance an overbroad infringement of first amendment rights.5 3
Justice White, writing for the majority,54 began his opinion by
accepting the New Jersey courts' determination that the Mount
picture ridicules or characterizes one point of view or another, the
effect of the ordinances is exactly the same.
Id. at 70. Cf. Goldman, supra note 18, at 293 (an ordinance cannot "discrimi-
nate between adult films which praise Communism and those which ridicule
it").
Professor Geoffrey Stone in his article Restrictions of Speech Because of
its Content The Peculiar Case of Subject-Matter Restrictions, 46 U. CHL L.
REv. 81 (1978), defined subject-based regulations as "content based restric-
tions defined in terms of expression about an entire subject, rather than in
terms of a particular viewpoint, idea, or item of information." Id. at 83. He
contended, however, that the Court has failed to recognize such restraints "as
a separate class of restraints on speech." Id. at 115.
51. Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 64 (1981). MouNT EPHRAnM,
N.J., OFFICIAL ZONING ORDINANCE § 99-15B provided:
B. Principal permitted uses on the land and in buildings.
(1) Offices and banks; taverns; restaurants and luncheonettes
for sit-down dinners only and with no drive-in facilities; automo-
bile sales; retail stores, such as but not limited to food, wearing
apparel, millinery, fabrics, hardware, lumber, jewelry, paint,
wallpaper, appliances, flowers, gifts, books, stationery, phar-
macy, liquors, cleaners, novelties, hobbies and toys; repair shops
for shoes, jewels, clothes, and appliances; barbershops and
beauty salons; cleaners and laundries; pet stores; and nurseries
(2) Motels.
Section 99-4 provided: "All uses not expressly permitted in this chapter are
prohibited." Id. § 99-4. Contrary to the lower court's interpretation in Schad,
see 452 U.S. at 64-65, the Mount Ephraim ordinance could also prohibit non-
live entertainment, e.g., movies.
52. 452 U.S. at 65.
53. See id. at 74-77.
54. Justice White was joined in his opinion by Justices Marshall, Brennan, Pow-
ell, Stewart, and Blackmun. Justice Stevens filed a separate opinion concur-
[Vol. 61:361
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Ephraim ordinance excluded all "live entertainment" in the Bor-
ough.55 With this premise in hand, Justice White approached the
case by focusing on the right infringed rather than the zoning
power exercised. This approach placed Schad in the first amend-
ment sphere involving a regulation based on content.5 6
Given this first amendment posture, Justice White identified
the speech infringed as live entertainment, including nude danc-
ing.57 With the infringement identified, he set up a middle tier
equal protection test,58 stating: "[W] hen a zoning law infringes
upon a protected liberty, it must be narrowly drawn and must fur-
ther a sufficiently substantial government interest."5 9 Mount
Ephraim asserted that the ordinance served its interests in helping
create a commercial area "cater [ing] only to the 'immediate needs'
of its residents" and in avoiding problems "such as parking, trash,
police protection, and medical facilities." 60 Justice White found
ring in the judgment. Justice Burger, joined by Justice Rehnquist, dissented.
See note 63 infra.
55. 452 U.S. at 65. The Court indicated that the ordinance might exclude only live
entertainment in commercial establishments, id. at 66 n.5, but that its deci-
sion would be similar if the ordinance excluded only the nude dancing in-
volved in the case. See id. at 73-74 n.15. Some live entertainment was
permitted under the ordinance as a nonconforming use, id. at 64 n.3; the
Court indicated that this undermined Mount Ephraim's case. Id. at 73 n.14.
Various interpretations of what the ordinance banned seemed to bother
the Court. Id. at 67 n.6. The Court indicated that it would have reached the
same result if the ordinance were interpreted to ban all entertainment. Id. at
72 n.12. Given this ambiguity, the Court was probably more likely to use the
overbreadth doctrine. See note 56 & accompanying text infra.
56. The first amendment focus of the case is also demonstrated by Justice
White's application of the traditional first amendment overbreadth doctrine.
452 U.S. at 66. This doctrine provides that a party may challenge the validity
of a law on overbreadth and vagueness grounds as the law applies to others.
See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972); Gooding v. Wilson, 405
U.S. 518 (1972); Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971). In Schad,
Justice White stated. "Because appellants' claims are rooted in the First
Amendment, they are entitled to rely on the impact of the ordinance on the
expressive activities of others as well as their own." 452 U.S. at 66. This is
commonly called the Thornhill doctrine from Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S.
88 (1940). Justice White did not mention the possible use of Broadrick v.
Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973), to prevent the application of the overbreadth
doctrine. Broadrick does not allow overbreadth challenges to statutes on the
basis of how the statute affects third parties, particularly where conduct is
involved, unless the overbreadth is "real" and "substantial" and the statute is
not subject to a narrowing construction. Id. at 615-16. See Note, supra note
10.
57. 452 U.S. at 65-66.
58. This middle tier test has been used to review classifications based on gender,
Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), and illegitimacy, Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259
(1978).
59. 452 U.S. at 68.
60. Id. at 72-73.
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the ordinance to be overbroad in relation to the governmental in-
terests it purportedly served.61 He reversed the New Jersey
courts,62 thereby overturning the appellants' convictions. 63
B. Why Protect the Speech?
The initial questions in analyzing first amendment cases are:
(1) what is the expression being protected, and (2) why should it
be protected? The Schad holding was based on the ordinance's ex-
clusion of live entertainment. However, the Court, in dictum, indi-
cated that it could have ranged from "all entertainment"64 to only
"nude dancing."65 The question thus raised is why these forms of
speech should be included under a first amendment umbrella.
61. Id. at 72-76. Justice White found that the Borough's justifications were not
supported by evidence showing how they were furthered by excluding only
live entertainment. Id. at 73-74.
62. Id. at 77. The Camden County Court refused to view Schad as a first amend-
ment case. The county court contended that the case involved only a zoning
ordinance. Id. at 64.
63. Id. at 77. Justice Blackmun concurred with Justice White's opinion, but sepa-
rately emphasized that the appropriate test, while more than rational basis,
should not be unsurmountable when zoning infringes on the first amend-
ment. He added that Schad should not be viewed as espousing a "reasonable
access" doctrine to be used in reviewing regulations. Id. at 78-79.
Justices Powell and Stewart also concurred with Justice White's opinion,
but felt that the focus of Schad should be on drafting. They contended that in
some instances zoning can be used legitimately to exclude all commercial
establishments or limit commercial establishments to essential services. Id.
at 79.
Justice Stevens did not join Justice White's opinion but concurred in the
judgment. He believed that the whole case turned on how the burden of per-
suasion was allocated because he stated: "[T] he record is opaque ... ." Id.
at 83. He faulted Mount Ephraim for this and therefore believed that it
should shoulder the burden of showing an adverse impact. Had Mount
Ephraim showed that this use introduced a "cacophony into a tranquil set-
ting," id., he would have upheld the ordinance "even if the live nude dancing
is a form of expressive activity protected by the First Amendment." Id.
Chief Justice Burger, joined by Justice Rehnquist, dissented. They
framed the issue in terms of "the right of a small community to ban an activ-
ity incompatible with a quiet, residential atmosphere." Id. at 85. They con-
tended that the overbreadth doctrine was misused by the majority in finding
that the right asserted encompassed "live entertainment" when the real right
asserted was "nude dancing." Id. at 86. They believed that protecting such
expression "trivializes and demeans" the first amendment. Id. at 88. Even
accepting the proposition that the expression was protected, they could not
ascertain how Schad could be distinguished from Young. They therefore
would have found the ordinance to be constitutional on its face and as ap-
plied. Id. at 86-88.
64. Id. at 72 n.12. See note 55 supra.
65. 452 U.S. at 73-74 n.15. The Court stated "Even if Mount Ephraim might val-
idly place restriction; on certain forms of live nude dancing under a narrowly
drawn ordinance, this would not justify the exclusion of all live entertain-
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The reasons advanced by first amendment theorists for protect-
ing various forms of speech range from protecting speech as an
end-in-itself 66 to protecting only speech necessary for self-govern-
ment.6 7 One popular theory is a "general" theory under which the
value of freedom of expression is viewed from the standpoint of its
potential to advance individual self-fulfillment.68 This value is in-
tegrated with other first amendment values, such as advancement
of knowledge, discovery of truth, participation in decision-making
by all members of society, and maintenance of a proper balance
between stability and change.6 9
On the other hand, under a strict political value theory, the
value of freedom of expression is viewed as limited to expression
necessary for self-government.7 0 At first glance, live entertain-
ment and nude dancing may not be protected under the political
value theory, however, they could easily be viewed as a means to-
ward individual self-fulfillment as a sought-after form of entertain-
ment for some people. Nevertheless, there is language in Schad
which supports both the general and political value theories as the
rationale for protecting the speech involved. The Court grouped
the activity regulated in Schad with political and ideological
speech stating that all were protected.7' Arguably, the Court rec-
ment or, insofar as this record reveals, even the nude dancing involved in this
case." Id. at 73-74 n.15. See note 55 supra.
66. See Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 U.C.L.A. L
REv. 964 (1978). Baker used a liberty model of the first amendment and
found: "Speech is protected not as a means to a collective good but because
of the value of speech conduct to the individual. The liberty theory justifies
protection because of the way the protected conduct fosters individual self-
realization and self-determination 'without improperly interfering with legiti-
mate claims of others." Id. at 966.
Similarly, Professor Tribe questioned whether freedom of speech is "in
part also an end in itself, an expression of the sort of society we wish to be-
come and the sort of persons we wish to be." TamE, supra note 6, § 12-1, at
576.
67. See A. MEIKnJOHN, PoLrrcAL FREEDOM (1965); Bork, Neutral Principles and
Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 26 (1971) (only explicit and
predominantly political speech should have preference to other freedoms).
68. T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREE EXPRESSION (1970); Karst, Equality as a
Central Principle ofthe FirstAmendment, 43 U. CL I. REV. 20,23 (1975) (one
purpose of the first amendment is to promote a sense of individual self-
worth).
69. T. EMERsoN, supra note 68, at 6-7 (values are integrated set of independent
values).
70. A. MEmIEOHN, supra note 67. Meiklejohn's model expanded as he included
within it communication necessary for voter objective judgment. He there-
fore found that writings ranging from documents to works of art, discussion
of opposing ideas, and the sovereignty of the individual in voting were neces-
sary for voter objective judgment. Id. at 117-18.
71. 452 U.S. at 65-66.
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ognized that live entertainment, while not directly political, often
carries political views. Although this suggests a political value
analysis, the Court's premise that the ordinance was suspect be-
cause it broadly limited communicative activity72 supports a gen-
eral theory self-fulfillment approach.
Perhaps the most compelling and relevant theory in the context
of content regulation is the negative value theory.73 Under this
theory, the value of freedom of speech is viewed as a restriction on
government suppression. Thus, expression such as "live en-
tertainment" would be protected because
once we allow the government any power to restrict the freedom of
speech, we may have taken a path which is a 'slippery slope.' Line-draw-
ing in such an abstract area is always difficult and especially so when a
government's natural inclination is moving the line towards more sup-
pression of criticism and unpopular ideas. If one could distinguish be-
tween" illegitimate and legitimate speech, it may still be necessary to
protect all speech in order to afford real protection for legitimate speech. 74
The Court found this view particularly important in Cohen v. Cali-
fornia.75 In Cohen, the Court, focusing on the bounds of the Cali-
fornia statute,76 stated: "[I]t is nevertheless often true that one
man's vulgarity is another's lyric. Indeed, we think it is largely be-
cause governmental officials cannot make principled distinctions
in this area that the Constitution leaves matters of taste and style
so largely to the individual."77 Similarly, the Schad Court, fearing
the boundless nature of the Mount Ephraim ordinance, used the
first amendment overbreadth doctrine to prevent deterrence of
protected activities.78
While there is support in the Schad opinion for each of the
three theories, the Court did not expressly endorse any one.
Whichever view the Court embraced, it did not use the Chaplinsky
approach,7 9 used in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation,80 that expression
only has "social value as a step to truth."81 Such a theoretical base
would have the unfortunate effect of greatly increasing the Court's
scope of permissible content regulation because most speech is
72. Id. at 71.
73. .J. NowAK, IL ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CoNsTrrTToNAL LAw 718
(1978).
74. Id. See Stone, supra note 50, at 101-04. (content-based restrictions distort
the workings of the "marketplace of ideas" and violate the principle of gov-
ernment impartiality).
75. 403 U.S. 15 (1971). See notes 21-24 & accompanying text upra.
76. See note 23 & accompanying text supra.
77. 403 U.S. at 25.
78. 452 U.S. at 66.
79. See notes 12-17, 49 & accompanying text supra.
80. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
81. Id. at 746. See note 49 supra.
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not intent on finding "truth."8 2
Nor did Schad cany the same tenor as Young v. American Mini
Theatres, Inc. ,83 which used a political type model for finding value
in speech for which we would " march our sons and daughters off to
war."84 The Court in Schad found value in preserving live en-
tertainment and thereby recognized that speech has value as ex-
pressed through different mediums whether the medium is
oratory, e.g., traditional political speech, or nude dancing.
C. What Level of Protection for the Speech?
After the Court decided that the speech involved in Schad was
"worthy" of first amendment protection, it determined the level of
protection by applying a middle tier equal protection test.8 5 This
raises the question of how the Court applied the model it explicitly
set forth.
A traditional first amendment analysis advocated by Professor
Tribe would require the Court to divide speech regulations into
two categories: (1) those aimed at communicative impact, i.e., reg-
ulation of the viewpoint expressed; and (2) those aimed at
noncommunicative impact, i.e., regulation for a government inter-
est distinct from the viewpoint.86 Professor Tribe believes that the
type of speech involved in the first category should be given full
traditional first amendment protection based on the rationale that
government should not restrict expression because of the ideas ex-
pressed.87 With respect to speech involved in the second category,
he believes that the Court should apply a balancing model on a
82. Cf. Emerson, First Amendment Doctrine and the Burger Court, 68 CALIF. I
REV. 422,443-45 (1980) (Chaplinsky exclusion approach is incompatible with
modem first amendment doctrine); Gard, supra note 15, at 577. (Chaplinsky
rationale should not be used to justify censorship of offensive words).
83. 427 U.S. 50 (1976). See notes 33-39 & accompanying text supra.
84. Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 70 (1976).
85. See notes 58-59 & accompanying text supra.
86. L. TRME, supra note 6, § 12.2, at 580-82. Tribe defined communicative impact
regulations as those by which the government seeks to control expression
because of the viewpoint that is expressed. Noncommunicative impact regu-
lations encompass government control of actions "because of the effect pro-
duced by awareness of the information such actions impart." Id. at 580. For
communicative impact cases, see: Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (de-
fendant arrested for the statement on his jacket); Street v. New York, 394 U.S.
576 (1969) (defendant arrested for burning an American flag); DeJonge v. Or-
egon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937) (defendant arrested for attending a meeting). For
noncommunicative impact cases, see: Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S.
104 (1972) (ordinance banning noisy demonstrations upheld); Kovacs v.
Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) (ordinance banning loudspeakers upheld).
87. L. TRmE, supra note 6, § 12.2, at 582. The regulation is unconstitutional unless
the government shows a clear and present danger or the speech falls within
an unprotected category. This is based on the negative value concept See
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case-by-case basis using unifying principles from past decisions
because the restriction is not for the ideas expressed but for an-
other government interest.88 The Schad Court did not explicitly
apply this traditional analysis; instead it recognized that a pro-
tected liberty was infringed89 without sufficient justification.90
However, it can be argued that the Court implicitly used the tradi-
tional analysis. When the Court examined Mount Ephraim's justi-
fications for the ordinance it looked at what the ordinance was
designed to prevent. After finding no sufficient justification for the
ordinance, the Court implicitly determined that the ordinance was
aimed at communicative impact. Thus, the Court may have be-
lieved that the ordinance was really aimed at stopping the expres-
sion itself and not devised for the interests asserted.
A self-proclaimed revisionist has criticized the traditional anal-
ysis,9 ' believing that a middle tier equal protection test should be
used in reviewing regulations that discriminate on the basis of con-
tent.92 If a regulation survives that test it then should be subject to
a balancing test based on the Cohen principles. 93 This is very close
to the test the Court set forth in Schad when it articulated a mid-
dle tier test and then claimed that the substantiality of the state's
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (current clear and present danger
doctrine).
88. L. TRIBE, supra note 6, § 12.2, at 582. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976); Grayned v. City
of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
89. 452 U.S. 61, 68 (1981).
90. Id. at 72.
91. Farber, Content Regulation and the First Amendment: A Revisionist View, 68
GEo. L.J. 727, 747 (1980). Farber contended: "[O]ne flaw in the communica-
tive impact approach is its broad definition of content regulation. Under that
definition, a regulation that affects all speech equally can still be considered a
form of content regulation if the justification for the regulation relates to com-
municative impact." Id.
92. Id. at 737-38, 747-48. Farber believes that the equal protection tests used in
illegitimacy and gender classification are appropriate to scrutinize regula-
tions that discriminate on the basis of content. He gave four reasons to use
this analysis: (1) it is less restrictive on future legislative efforts; (2) it serves
to protect speech by making regulations take a broader form which the public
will be unwilling to tolerate; (3) it is easier to apply than a balancing test;
(4) it can reduce "chill" effects because it could invalidate an ordinance on its
face. Id. at 748 n.100.
93. Id. at 748. Farber set forth three principles to use in balancing:. (1) a consider-
ation of only those justifications upon which the statute clearly focuses; (2) a
reluctance to add to the list of acceptable justifications for content regulation;
and (3) balancing with an awareness and sensitivity to first amendment val-
ues and precedent. Id.
Professor Farber ignored the Court's ability to make the necessary dis-
tinctions in first amendment areas. He also ignored the chilling effect on first
amendment rights caused by the use of a loose equal protection test because
of its lack of guidance to courts and legislators.
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interest should be judged by the Schneider v. State94 analysis,
under which the infringement of first amendment rights is bal-
anced against reasons supporting the infringement.95 From this
premise the Court proceeded to analyze the relationship of Mount
Ephraim's justifications to the ordinance. However, because the
ordinance was not drawn narrowly enough to meet Mount
Ephraim's interests, the Court did not have to balance the compet-
ing interests. Thus, it did not develop the contours of the balanc-
ing test beyond citing Schneider.9 6
To support its use of the middle tier test the Court cited two
zoning cases 97 and one first amendment case.98 Relying on these
cases, the Court indicated that Schad involved more than zoning
and that more than a minimal burden was placed on first amend-
ment rights by the Mount Ephraim ordinance.
The Court applied the middle tier test by scrutinizing the dis-
tinction the Mount Ephraim ordinance made between the classes
of commercial uses which were expressly permitted and live en-
tertainment which was not.99 The Court determined that although
some forms of live entertainment could create problems not asso-
94. 308 U.S. 147 (1939). In Schneider, the Court used a balancing test to hold inva-
lid an ordinance which required a permit to canvas a public street with leaf-
lets. The Court stated: "[T]he delicate and difficult task falls upon the courts
to weigh the circumstances and to appraise the substantiality of the reasons
advanced in support of the regulation of the free enjoyment of the [first
amendment] rights." Id. at 161.
95. 452 U.S. at 68-70.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 68-69 n.7. In the first cited zoning case, Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas,
416 U.S. 1 (1974), the Court, using a rational basis test, upheld a zoning ordi-
nance which restricted land use to one-family dwellings and defined family to
include related individuals or two unrelated individuals. n his dissent, Jus-
tice Marshall called for applying a strict scrutiny test because the ordinance
restricted the rights of association and privacy. Id. at 13 (Marshall, J., dis-
senting). The Belle Terre dissent became relevant in the second-cited case,
Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 444 (1977), in which the Court struck
down an ordinance which limited occupancy of dwellings to a single family
which was defined so as to restrict even some related individuals from living
with each other. The Moore case indicates that when a protected liberty (the
institution of the family) is involved, more than a rational basis test is
applied.
98. 452 U.S. at 68-69 n.7. The first amendment case cited, United States v.
O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), provides a test to be used when freedom of
speech is only incidentally affected. See note 121 & accompanying text infra.
In O'Brien, the Court upheld a statute forbidding the burning of one's draft
card. See note 6 supra. The defendant in Schad cited O'Brien as supplying
the appropriate test. Brief of Appellant at 18-23, Schad v. Borough of Mount
Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981).
99. 452 U.S. at 73-74. See generally Karst, supra note 68, at 20 (equality of liberty
is at the heart of the first amendment when content regulation is involved);
note 45 & accompanying text supra.
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ciated with commercial uses permitted under the ordinance, the
ordinance was not narrowly drawn to respond to whatever those
problems might be.100 By focusing the middle tier test on the tai-
loring of the statute to the Borough's interests, the Court never
had to judge "the substantiality of the governmental interests."'1o
The Court's use of the middle tier test and its focus on the ordi-
nance's breadth present problems for legislators and courts in de-
termining the scope of permissible content regulation and the
protection which must be accorded to first amendment rights. The
main problem is in determining the degree of scrutiny a court
must apply to government justifications for regulations of different
types of speech. In Schad, the Court did not blindly accept the
Borough's justifications for the ordinance but instead questioned
their applicability. This suggests that a greater level of scrutiny is
required than the minimal level of scrutiny in Young where the
Court accepted without question the city's justification for dispers-
ing adult theatres. 0 2
A second problem arises in determining how substantial the
government interest must be to uphold a regulation which is nar-
rowly tailored to serve the government interest. This apparently
may vary depending on the content of the speech. 03
Finally, the Court's focusing of a middle tier test on the tailor-
ing of a regulation to the state's interests* may jeopardize first
amendment rights. Under such an approach, resolution of first
amendment issues will depend upon how statutes or ordinances
are drafted instead of the importance of freedom of speech itself.
Hopefully, such an approach will not lead lawmakers to draft more
comprehensive statutes or ordinances which might avoid the prob-
lem of unjustifiable distinctions between classes of regulated
100. 452 U.S. at 73-74.
101. Id. at 70.
102. See notes 113-17 & accompanying text infra; note 48 supra.
103. See notes 48-50 & accompanying text supra; Goldman, supra note.18, at 301-07.
Professor Goldman saw problems ahead for the Court if it adhered to the
middle tier equal protection test used in Young and in other content-based
regulation cases. He questioned how the Court would rank levels of speech,
the state's interests, and "the cause and effect relationship between the
speech regulated and the asserted evil the state is seeking to avoid." Id. at
301. He acknowledged that while there were problems with the categorical
approach, at least it provided ease of application and guidance to legislators.
Id. at 306. But see Karst, supra note 68, at 66-67. Professor Karst cited four
benefits of equal protection analysis: (1) it protects first amendment values
without attacking state interests; (2) a state can re-tailor its statute to meet
its interests; (3) it encourages an interventionist Court; and (4) equal treat-






To determine what Schad portends for the future, one must ex-
amine the Court's reasoning in distinguishing Young v. American
Mini Theatres, Inc. 105 from Schad. The Court found Young distin-
guishable because: (1) the Young ordinance placed a minimal
burden on first amendment rights, and (2) the City of Detroit in
Young presented evidence which justified the regulation's burden
on first amendment interests. 06 These distinctions, however, ap-
pear to be more of an implicit ranking of speech content than real
distinctions, since each distinction is either irrelevant or
superficial.
1. Burden on First Amendment Rights
The Court contended that Young placed only a minimal burden
on first amendment rights as compared to Schad because in Young
the ordinance merely dispersed adult entertainment, while in
Schad, the ordinance totally prohibited all live entertainment.
Phrasing the distinction in this fashion makes the controlling fac-
tor the scope of the ordinance and not its real effect on first amend-
ment rights.107 Seemingly, this distinction would allow a
governmental body to burden first amendment rights if its jurisdic-
tion were broad enough. As the majority in Schad noted:
[The Borough's] position suggests the argument that if there were county-
wide zoning, it would be quite legal to allow live entertainment in only
selected areas of the county and to exclude it from primarily residential
104. This is illustrated in Schad where the Court stated. "Mount Ephraim asserts
that it could have chosen to eliminate all commercial uses within its bounda-
ries. Yet we must assess the exclusion of live entertainment in light of the
commercial uses Mount Ephraim allows, not in light of what the Borough
might have done." 452 U.S. at 75.
105. 427 U.S. 50 (1976). See notes 7-9 & accompanying text supra.
106. 452 U.S. at 71-72. The Court stated-
[I]t was emphasized in that case [Young] that the evidence
presented to the Detroit Common Council indicated that the concen-
tration of adult movie theatres in limited areas led to deterioration of
surrounding neighborhoods, and it was concluded that the city had
justified the incidental burden on First Amendment interests result-
ing from merely dispersing, but not excluding, adult theaters.
In this case, however, Mount Ephraim has not adequately justi-
fied its substantial restriction of protected activity.
Id. (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
107. For example, while the Detroit ordinance dispersed adult theaters, in a city
the size of Detroit this could have practically eliminated adult theaters which
would not hdve a feasible place to relocate. In Mount Ephraim, where poten-
tial live entertainment was totally excluded, the ordinance might have only
eliminated very few prospective business ventures.
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communities, such as the Borough of Mount Ephraim. This may very well
be true, but the Borough cannot avail itself of that argument in this
case.108
This apparently permissible distinction based on the type of zon-
ing involved has no substantive relation to first amendment rights.
In reality it is a mere factual distinction which the Court should
not rely upon in the future.109
It could be argued that a more severe burden on first amend-
ment rights was effected in Schad because the ordinance prohib-
ited all live entertainment while the Young ordinance was
restricted to nonobscene adult entertainment with specified sexual
acts." 0 However this is a questionable distinction in view of the
Court's dictum that it would have decided similarly had the Mount
Ephraim ordinance only prohibited the nude dancing involved in
the case."' Additionally, this distinction limits the Young deci-
sion to statutes which specify sexual acts for adult entertain-
ment." 2 Such dividing of nonobscene nudity into grades would
seem to be a task the Court would not wisely accept because of the
burden it would place on the Court's time and the impossibility of
making relevant distinctions in this area.
2. Supporting Evidence
The Court also distinguished Young from Schad because, in
Young, there were findings by the Detroit Common Council"3
which supported Detroit's justification for the ordinance. The
Young Court did not scrutinize these findings but accepted them
at face value." 4 In contrast, in Schad, the Borough of Mount
Ephraim did not have evidence to support its justifications for the
108. 452 U.S. at 76.
109. This factual distinction has its roots in Young v. American Mini Theatres,
Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976), where the Court used an alternative means test with
respect to the place of exercising freedom of expression to show the limited
burden on first amendment rights. See notes 38, 43 & accompanying text
supra.
110. This distinction can be seen as implicit in the Schad opinion given the em-
phasis on the breadth of the Mount Ephraim ordinance. The Detroit ordi-
nance in Young enumerated the sexual acts that would classify a theatre as
"adult." 427 U.S. at 53 n.4.
111. 452 U.S. at 73-74 n.15. See note 65 & accompanying text supra.
112. In Young, Justice Powell distinguished the Erznoznik majority opinion(which he authored) by saying that the Jacksonville ordinance was not an
incidental restriction on the first amendment, as it was overbroad in prohibit-
ing the "showing of any nudity, however innocent or educational." 427 U.S. at
83 (Powell, J., concurring).
113. 427 U.S. at 54-55. Detroit's reason for the ordinance was to "preserve the qual-
ity of urban life"; the Court felt this was entitled to great respect. Id. at 71.
See note 50 & accompanying text supra.
114. 427 U.S. at 71. See note 48 supra; cf. Goldman, supra note 18, at 286 (lack of
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ordinance; the Court did not accept the Borough's justifications for
its regulation but closely scrutinized them.n5 Thus perhaps the
real distinction between Young and Schad was not the evidence
but the degree of scrutiny the Court applied." 6 This difference in
scrutiny could be related to the distinction the Court made be-
tween the extent each ordinance burdened first amendment rights.
As discussed above, this distinction has little substance." 7 In us-
ing such surface distinctions, however, the Court must have im-
plicitly ranked the speech in Young at a lower level than the
speech in Schad, thereby according each a different level of judi-
cial scrutiny.
IV. SCHAD'S CONTRIBUTION TO THE DOCTRINE OF
CONTENT REGULATION
The Schad Court refined the developing content regulation doc-
trine by: (1) articulating a middle tier equal protection test to be
employed in analyzing regulations of speech based on content,"n8
and (2) changing the focus from the social value of speech to the
drafting of acceptable statutes." 9 However, the extent to which
the latter effects a genuine refinement is clouded by the Court's
implicit changing of the level of scrutiny given to a regulation
based on its view of the value of the speech involved. 20
Additionally, Schad reaffirmed the Court's use of an alternative
means test to judge the impact of a regulation on first amendment
rights. Further Schad is important because the Court did not use
the O'Brien test'21 used in Young by Justice Powell' 22 and subse-
scrutiny typifies open balancing when the government-stated objectives are
accepted at face value).
115. See 452 U.S. at 72-74; notes 60-61 & accompanying text supra.
116. See generally note 103 & accompanying text supra.
117. This relates to the distinction between nudity and adult entertainment with
specified sexual acts in ranking the importance of the speech affected. It also
relates to the distinction between total exclusion zoning and dispersal zon-
ing. See notes 107-12 & accompanying text supra.
118. See notes 58-59 & accompanying text supra.
119. See notes 99-101 & accompanying text supra.
120. This was demonstrated by the Court's distinguishing Young from Schad. See
notes 113-17 & accompanying text supra.
121. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). O'Brien set forth four require-
ments to be met to uphold a regulation that burdened first amendment rights:
[W] e think it clear that a government regulation is sufficiently justi-
fied if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; if it
furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the
governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expres-
sion; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment
freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that
interest.
Id. at 377. See notes 6, 98 supra.




quently used by other courts as the proper test for cases of content
regulation.123
Schad will thus have an impact on judicial review of regulations
based on the content of speech. It provides the courts with a more
certain test to apply. Instead of questioning whether to apply the
Young plurality opinion124 or the O'Brien test, Schad sets forth a
majority decision which clearly calls for a middle tier equal protec-
tion test.12 5 Nevertheless, Schad does little to clarify the permissi-
ble scope of regulations based on the content of speech.
Schad will also have an impact on judicial review of zoning reg-
ulations, particularly those used to eliminate adult entertainment
establishments. If courts follow the distinctions made by the
Schad Court between the Young ordinance and that in Schad,
they will examine the burden an ordinance places on first amend-
ment rights by focusing on the scope of the ordinance. 2 6 This may
lead zoning board authorities to encompass larger areas thus en-
abling them to exclude adult entertainment in certain areas under
the Young dispersal standard. In the areas of both speech regula-
tion standards and zoning, legislators will be forced to sharpen
their skills in drafting regulations, while courts will have to
sharpen their skills in scrutinizing them.
V. CONCLUSION
Court acceptance of a doctrine which allows regulation of pro-
tected speech based on its content is troubling for persons con-
cerned with the degradation of first amendment rights. Justices
Stevens, Rehnquist, Burger, and White explicitly have accepted
the content regulation concept,127 while Justices Brennan, Mar-
123. E.g., Fantasy Book Shop, Inc. v. City of Boston, 652 F.2d 1115 (1st Cir. 1981)
(licensing adult entertainment); Marco Lounge, Inc. v. City of Federal
Heights, - Colo. -, 625 P.2d 982 (1981) (zoning live nude entertainment).
124.. The Young standard, speecb foi: which we "would march our sons and daugh-
ters off to war." 427 U.S. at 70 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion), is a difficult one
to apply. See note 37 & accompanying text supra.
125. The proper application of the test, however, is unclear. See notes 102-03 &
accompanying text supra.
126. See Kacar, Inc. v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 432 A.2d 310 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1981).
The Pennsylvania Court in Kacar indicated that Schad was distinguished
from Young based on the burden on first amendment rights effected by a
total exclusion of the use involved. Id. at 316 n.8.
Schad also could increase the amount of evidence necessary to sustain a
content-based regulation. See notes 113-17 & accompanying text supra.
.127. Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (Stevens, J., plural-
ity opinion). See notes 33-39 & accompanying text supra.
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shall, Stewart, and Blacknun explicitly have rejected it.128 Justice
Powell has been the fragile swing vote on content regulation is-
sues. Justice Powell has accepted the concept of content regula-
tion only if the impact on first amendment rights is incidental,12 9
otherwise he has explicitly rejected it.130 This balance in the
Supreme Court can now be subject to change with the retirement
of Justice Stewart and his replacement by Justice O'Connor. De-
pending on Justice O'Connor's view of content regulation, the bal-
ance in the Supreme Court can either be restored, or, in the
alternative, content regulation can become an acceptable doctrine
for a majority of the Court.' 3 '
David M. Scanga '83
128. Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 471-72 (1980) (Stewart, J., concurring); FCC v.
Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 762-77 (1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 88-96 (Blackmun, J., dis-
senting); id. at 84-88 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
129. Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 79-82 (1976) (Powell, J.,
concurring).
130. FCC v. Paciflca Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 761-62 (Powell, J., concurring).
131. In Widmar v. Vincent, 102 S. Ct. 296 (1981), a university regulation prohibiting
use of university facilities for religious groups was found to be an unconstitu-
tional content-based regulation. The Court struck down the ordinance using
a strict scrutiny equal protection test. Interests in religious freedom and as-
sociation may have been the reason for the increased scrutiny. All the Jus-
tices joined the majority opinion except Justice Stevens who concurred in the
judgment and Justice White who dissented.
1982]
